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Abstract
Basel III is a recently-agreed regulatory standard for bank capital adequacy with
focus on the macroprudential dimension of banking regulation, i.e., the system-
wide implications of banks’ lending and risk. An important Basel III provision is
to reduce procyclicality of present banking regulation and promote countercyclical
capital buffers for banks. The Eurace agent-based macroeconomic model and sim-
ulator has been recently showed to be able to reproduce a credit-fueled boom-bust
dynamics where excessive bank leverages, while benefitting in the short term, have
destabilizing effects in the medium-long term. In this paper we employ the Eu-
race model to test regulatory policies providing time varying capital requirements
for banks, based on mechanisms that enforce banks to build up or release capital
buffers, according to the overall conditions of the economy. As conditioning variables
for these dynamic policies, both the unemployment rate and the aggregate credit
growth have been considered. Results show that the dynamic regulation of capital
requirements is generally more successful than fixed tight capital requirements in
stabilizing the economy and improving the macroeconomic performance.
Key words: Basel III, macroprudential regulation, agent-based models and
simulation
Introduction
The recent economic and financial crisis has cast serious doubt on the idea of
efficient self-regulating financial and credit markets, and consequently the need
for a more effective regulation of these markets unquestionably has arisen. As
a response to the crisis, a new global regulatory standard has been proposed
1 Corresponding author. E-mail: marco.raberto@unige.it
Submitted to Revue de l’OFCE 11 June 2012
under the name of Basel III 2 , with the objective to improve the resilience of
the banking system.
The rational behind Basel III regulation, which is founded on the same three
pillars 3 characterizing its previous version Basel II, is that one of the main
reasons why the economic crisis became so severe was that the banking sectors
of many countries had built up excessive on and off-balance sheet leverage.
The erosion of the level and quality of the capital base determined that the
banking system was not able to absorb systemic trading and credit losses nor
could it cope with the large off-balance sheet exposures. The crisis was further
amplified by a procyclical deleveraging process. The weaknesses in the banking
sector were rapidly transmitted to the rest of the financial system and the real
economy, resulting in a massive contraction of liquidity and credit availability
(for more details see BIS (2011)).
Some previous works by the authors reproduced these economic mechanisms
by means of the agent-based model and simulator Eurace (see Raberto et al
(2011); Teglio et al (2012)). In particular, Raberto et al (2011) shows that ex-
cessive bank leverages can drive economies into severe recession in the medium-
long run. The pressure on wages and labor costs during credit-fueled economic
booms, in conjunction with the speed of growth of credit-money, causes a rise
of inflation, that in turn can determine higher interest rates. Excessively in-
debted firms may be unable to fulfill their financial commitments with the
cash proceedings of their revenues, and may be obliged to take new loans to
pay interests on their debt, therefore entering in a Ponzi scheme. However, the
deterioration of firms creditworthiness causes a further rise of interest rates
due to the widening of the risk spread on policy rates. This, in turn, affects
the balance sheet of highly indebted firms, which may become soon insolvent.
Debt write-offs reduce banks’s equity and their lending capacity, thus causing
a widespread credit rationing and a forced deleveraging of the corporate sec-
tor that may trigger a possible wave of bankruptcies of even good but illiquid
firms. A credit-fueled economic boom may thus turn out in a depression.
Given this economic dynamics, emerged in Raberto et al (2011), the aim of
this paper is to understand if some of the post-crisis measures proposed by
the Basel Committee can have a positive impact in our model.
According to Borio (2011), the institutional response after the crisis has taken
two forms. Policymakers have been strengthening the systemic (or macro-
prudential) orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks, and they
have begun to question the premise that financial stability can be secured
2 For details and documents on Basel III, please visit the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) website at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm
3 The three pillars are: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review process
and market discipline. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
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without a more active support of macroeconomic policies. The established
pre-crisis policy framework was focused on the stability of individual institu-
tions (micro-prudential orientation) while the reforms introduced in Basel III
provide a macro-prudential approach to regulation and supervision that has
a system-wide focus, with the goal to limit the risk of episodes of financial
distress with serious consequences for the real economy (“systemic risk”).
Claiming that one of the most destabilizing elements of the crisis has been the
procyclical amplification of financial shocks throughout the banking system,
the new regulation framework introduces some measures in order to make
banks more resilient to such procyclical dynamics, like encouraging banks to
create countercyclical capital buffers in order to accumulate capital when the
economy is strong and use it when the economic conditions are bad. The
problem, pointed out again by the Basel Committee in BIS (2011) and also
emerged from the computational experiments of Raberto et al (2011), is that
losses incurred in the banking sector can be extremely large when a downturn
is preceded by a period of excess credit growth. These losses can destabilize
the banking sector, creating a credit crunch that contributes to a downturn in
the real economy that then feeds back on to the banking sector again.
According to Drehmann et al (2010), the main target of countercyclical capital
standards is to encourage banks to build up buffers in good times that can be
drawn down in bad ones. In this paper, we design two endogenous adaptive
policy rules for the Eurace agent-based model, that set capital requirements
in the spirit of encouraging banks to build up capital buffers in good times.
Details about the implementation of these policy rules, as identifying bad and
good times and choosing the conditioning variables which could guide the
build-up and release of capital, are discussed in section 3.1.
The issue of pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy has been widely discussed in
the literature of the last 20 years. Blum and Hellwig (1995) already observed
that a “rigid link between bank equity and bank lending may act as an auto-
matic amplifier for economic fluctuations, inducing banks to lend more when
times are good and to lend less when times are bad, thus reinforcing under-
lying shocks”. They propose a simple stylized macroeconomic model where
banks must satisfy a minimum-reserve requirement and a capital adequacy
requirement, in order to study the effects of demand disturbance for different
levels of capital requirements. Their conclusion, later extended by Cecchetti
and Li (2008) in a more complete economic framework, is that capital re-
quirements have a significant macroeconomic impact. Heid (2007) presents a
model with a representative bank which invests in riskless bonds and loans,
subject to regulatory constraint, explaining the cyclical effects of capital re-
quirements also in the case of banks which always hold a positive capital
buffer. In Raberto et al (2011) and Teglio et al (2012), we addressed simi-
lar issues using an agent-based methodology, confirming and extending the
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relevance of the macroeconomic implications of capital requirements. We are
both able to reproduce the endogenous amplification of economic fluctuations
and to observe how these fluctuation are affected by different levels of capital
requirements.
In the last ten years, and markedly after the 2007 crisis, the discussion on bank
regulation and pro-cyclicality significantly increased, incorporating new con-
cepts as “systemic risk”. Acharya (2009) shows that capital adequacy require-
ments fail to mitigate systemic risk, using a multi-period general equilibrium
model with many agents and markets, inspired to the Allen and Gale (2000)
one-period model of bubbles and crisis. In order to assess the cyclaclity of cap-
ital requirements, several macroeconometric models have been proposed and
estimated on data of different countries. Andersen (2011) and Anta˜o and Lac-
erda (2011) simulate the IRB (internal rating based) approach of Basel II using
Norwegian and Portuguese data respectively, both confirming the cyclicality of
capital requirements and comparing the new regulatory framework with the
previous one of Basel I 4 . More recently, in particular after the appearance
of Basel III, a discussion about the utility and the correct implementation of
macroprudential regulation of the banking sector has arisen. Repullo and Sau-
rina (2011) present a critical assessment of the countercyclical capital buffer in
Basel III, evaluating the “conditioning variables” suggested for taking buffer
decisions (see Drehmann et al (2010)). Their conclusion is that the choice
of the credit-to-GDP gap as the “common reference point” for taking buffer
decisions can be misleading because its correlation with the GDP growth is
generally negative, and this contradicts the necessity of building buffers of re-
sources in good times that can draw down when conditions deteriorate. They
also claim that credit growth “appears to be a much better common reference
point for the countercyclical capital buffer”. As it will be shown in section 4
our results confirm the efficacy of credit growth as conditioning variable.
In this paper we study the macroeconomic implications of macroprudential
policy regulations using an agent-based approach. With respect to the previ-
ous literature, mainly consisting in general equilibrium models or macroecono-
metric models, the Eurace agent-based model and simulator is a much more
complex environment where all the economic adjustments are endogenous and
produced by the interaction of many heterogeneous agents acting in different
markets. The completeness of the Eurace framework is particularly important
in this study, where it is necessary to consider the interplay and spillover be-
tween the production and financial sector, as well as the credit sector of the
economy. In the last decade, several agent-based economic models have been
developed in order to focus on the relation between the credit and financial
factors and the real economy, see e.g. Delli Gatti et al (2005, 2009); Raberto
4 In Basel II, with respect to Basel I, the capital charges depend on asset quality,
based on public or internal ratings, rather than on asset type.
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et al (2008a); Dosi et al (2010); Chiarella and Di Guilmi (2011). However,
the novelty and the advantage of the Eurace framework is the simultaneous
presence of the most important economic agents interacting in many different
markets. This feature allows for an endogenous and realistic representation
of the whole economic system in an evolving dynamic setting, which has no
antecedents in the history of economic modelling.
The paper is divided as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of the general
structural features of the Eurace model with the related references. Section 2
reports a detailed description of a new model for capital goods’ demand within
Eurace, while a throughout description of the implementation of the Basel II
capital requirements rule and of the new countercyclical policies is reported
in section 3. Computational results are presented and discussed in Section 4,
while Section 5 draws our concluding remarks.
1 An overview of the Eurace model
Eurace is a model and simulator of an artificial economy which belongs to the
class of agent-based computational models (see Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) for
a review). The agent-based approach to economics addresses the modelling of
economic systems as complex adaptive systems, i.e., systems made by many
self-interested interacting units (economic agents here) that may change their
behavior in order to adapt to the changing (economic) environment and the
change of other units’ behavior. The main distinguishing features of an agent-
based artificial economy with respect to the mainstream dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) modelling can be summarized as follows: out-of-
equilibrium dynamics versus market equilibrium, decentralized markets with
pairwise bargaining and price dispersion versus centralized markets and the
law of one price, adaptive expectations with myopic behavior versus ratio-
nal expectations and infinite foresight, endogenous shocks and business cycles
versus exogenous shocks.
The Eurace artificial economy has been constantly evolving since the start in
2006 of the Eurace project within a EU-funded research grant under the sixth
framework programme. Eurace is a fully-specified agent-based model of a com-
plete economy that includes different types of agents and integrates different
types of markets. Agents include households which act as consumers, workers
and financial investors, consumption goods producers as well as capital goods
producers, banks, a government and a central bank. Agents interact in dif-
ferent types of markets, namely markets for consumption goods and capital
goods, a labor market, a credit market and a financial markets for stocks and
government bonds. Except for the financial market, all markets are charac-
terized by decentralized exchange with price setting behavior on the supply
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side. Agents’ decision processes are characterized by bounded rationality and
limited information gathering and computational capabilities; thus, agents’ be-
havior follow adaptive rules derived from the management literature for firms
and banks, and from experimental and behavioral economics for consumers
and financial investors.
In the following, we outline the structural features of the Eurace economy
with respect to the agents considered, the types of real and financial assets
owned and exchanged by agents as well as the related payment commitments
over time. Finally, table 2 presents the balance sheets entries of the Eurace
agents. The balance sheets variables can be regarded as the state variables
of any agent and, along with wages, interests and prices, are endogenously
determined within the system. In particular, wages and consumption goods
prices are heterogeneous and fixed by any CGP according to labor market
conditions and costs, interest rates are fixed by banks and are heterogeneous
as well, because they depend on the creditworthiness of the borrower as well
as on the central bank rate 5 ; in both cases see Raberto et al (2011); Cincotti
et al (2012) for further details. The only exogenous variables is the price of
energy (or raw materials) which is considered constant and accordingly the
price of capital goods pK which is constant as well, being a fixed mark-up on
the energy price. The number of the different types of agents is also fixed.
1.1 Types of agents
• Households (Hous) (indexed by h)
• Consumption goods producers (CGP) (also named firms and indexed by f)
• Investment goods producer (KGP)
• Banks (B) (indexed by b)
• Foreign Sector (FgnS)
• Government (Gov)
• Central Bank (CB)
5 The central bank policy rate is endogenously determined via a Taylor rule
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Hous CGP KGP B FgnS Gov CB
Hous equity shares C goods deposits transfers
gov. bonds equity shares gov. bonds
dividends coupons
CGP labor K goods loans
deposits
KGP deposits raw mat.
B interests loans
principal deposits
FgnS
Gov taxes taxes taxes taxes seignorage
CB interests bonds
principal coupons
Table 1
Interaction matrix of the Eurace model. The matrix should be read as follows: row
agents are the ones demanding or receiving real assets (denoted in small caps),
financial assets (denoted in bolded style) and their related monetary payment
commitments over time (denoted in italics); column agents are the ones supplying
the corresponding real assets, financial assets and their related monetary flows
.
1.2 Types of Assets
1.2.1 Real assets
• homogeneous consumption goods (C goods): (q);
• homogeneous capital goods (K goods): (K);
• homogeneous energy or raw materials;
• homogeneous labor units: (L).
1.2.2 Financial assets
• deposits (of households, firms and the KGP) at banks;
• deposits (of banks and the government) at the central bank;
• loans from banks to firms;
• loans from the central bank to banks;
• equity shares (for firms, banks and the capital good producer);
• government bonds.
Agents’ behaviors are thoroughly described in our previous works, see e.g.
Raberto et al (2011); Teglio et al (2010b); Cincotti et al (2012) about decision
making hypotheses in real (consumption goods and labor) markets as well as in
credit markets. In particular, consumption goods producers as well as banks
are short-term profit maximizers that fix prices (the price of consumption
goods and the lending rate) based on a fixed mark-up on their costs (wages
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Agent Assets Liabilities
Household Liquidity Equity
Equity shares
Gov bonds
CGP Capital goods (Kf ) Loans
(
Df =
∑
b
`f
b
)
Inventories Equity (Ef )
Liquidity
KGP Liquidity Equity
Bank Loans
(∑
f
`f
b
)
Deposits (Liquidity of Hous, CGP and the KGP)
Liquidity Standing facility with the CB
Equity
Government Liquidity Bonds
Equity
Central Bank Standing facility with Banks Outstanding fiat money
Gov bonds Deposits (Liquidity of Banks and the Gov)
Liquidity Equity
Table 2
Balance sheets of the agents in the Eurace economy.
.
and cost of capital for CGPs and the central bank policy rate for banks). CGPs
make their production decisions according to standard results from inventory
theory (Hillier and Lieberman, 1986). Households’ saving-consumption de-
cision is modelled according to the theory of buffer-stock saving behaviour
(Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which states that households consumption de-
pends on a precautionary saving motive, determined by a target level of wealth
to income ratio. Households can invest their savings in the asset market, by
buying and selling equity shares or government bonds. Households’ portfolio
allocation is modeled according to a preference structure designed to take into
account the psychological findings emerged in the framework of behavioral
finance and in particular of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Household’s behavior in the financial market
has been thoroughly described in Raberto et al (2008b); Teglio et al (2009). It
is worth noting, however, that only the equity shares of CGPs are exchanged
among households in the stock market and only CGPs are allowed to issue
new equity shares to be sold to households (see the related cells in the In-
teraction Matrx in table 1). Equity shares of the KGP as well as of banks
are equally distributed among households and can not be traded; put in an-
other way, profits of the KGP and of banks are equaly shared and distributed
to households. Finally, the balance sheet approach employed in agent-based
modeling, as outlined in table 2 is described in details in Teglio et al (2010a)
and in Cincotti et al (2010), where computational experiments about the use
of quantitative easing policies have been reported.
The computational experiments reported in this study have been realized
within an enriched version of the Eurace model. In particular, beside the new
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regulatory policies designed and investigated in this study, the Eurace model
and simulator employed here is characterized by a new model for capital goods
demand and a better founded model for the estimation of bankruptcy proba-
bility for firms, as described in the following sections.
2 Capital goods investments
2.1 Demand of capital goods
Physical capital K is employed with labor L by consumption goods producers,
henceforth CGPs, to produce an amount of consumption goods q according
to a Cobb-Douglas technology, as follows
q = γLαKβ , (1)
where γ is positive and constant returns to scale are considered, i.e. α and β
are positive constants with the constraint α + β = 1. CGPs need new capi-
tal goods both to replace capital depreciation and to expand the production
capacity. In the previous version of the Eurace model, see e.g. Raberto et al
(2011), CGPs computed the desired amount of physical capital, given the
planned production quantity, by means of a static optimization method based
on the Cobb-Douglas technology and isoquants. In the new model presented
here, the demand for capital goods is based on the net present value (NPV)
approach, which, according to a recent empirical survey (Graham and Harvey,
2001, 2002), is, along with the internal rate of return (IRR) 6 , the most pop-
ular method used by managers to evaluate investments. The new investments
model should be therefore considered better founded on the realistic behavior
of economic actors.
CGPs compute their demand for new capital goods, henceforth investments or
I, at the beginning of any production month 7 . The amount I of new capital
goods will then be delivered and will be ready to use during the next pro-
duction month. The first step in computing the demand of new capital goods
6 It can be shown, however, that the IRR is generally equivalent to the NPV, except
for some special cases.
7 It is worth remembering that 1 month, i.e., 20 business days, is the basic time
span for the production process in Eurace and that the starting production day of
the month is fixed for each firm but can be different (asynchronous) among different
firms.
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is the estimation 8 by every CGP of the expected demand q̂d of consumption
goods it should face during the month. Based on this estimate and on the in-
ventories amount V , the CGP computes the production needs q¯ as q¯ = q̂d−V ,
if V < q̂d, or q¯ = 0 otherwise. Given the production goal q¯, its present capi-
tal endowment K and the Coob-Douglas technology, any CGP computes the
necessary workforce Ld in order to meet the production goal as:
Ld =
(
q¯
γ Kβ
) 1
α
. (2)
Considering the present workforce L, the CGP opens new vacancies, if Ld > L,
or decides layoffs if Ld < L.
It is worth noting that, if the present workforce L and the present endow-
ment of physical capital K are not sufficient to meet the production goal, i.e.,
q¯ > γLαKβ, increasing the workforce to Ld is the only feasible way to meet
the production goal during the present month. The reason is that the new
demanded physical capital would be available to the CGP only from the next
month. Nevertheless, the expected demand q̂d is still used to determine the
demand of new capital goods. The rationale is that the CGP has to check if
the increase of the stock of physical capital to meet the production goal, given
the present workforce, is profitable in the reasonable hypothesis that qd would
be a lower bound for demand in the future.
If q¯ > γLαKβ, the CGP computes the desired endowment of physical capital
Kd as follows:
Kd =
(
q¯
γ Lα
) 1
β
. (3)
The difference Kd−K is a reference point for investments. It is worth noting,
however, that according to the realistic hypothesis of imperfect capital mar-
kets in Eurace and according to the difference between internal and external
financing for producers, we stipulate, in line with Fazzari et al (2008), that
cash flows are a bound for nominal investments and we consider last month
CGP revenues as a proxy for cash flows.
The CGP computes the NPV using a grid of investment values I in the range
between 0 and Imax, where Imax is given by the minimum between K
d − K
and last months revenues divided by the price of capital pK , set by the capital
8 The estimate is based on a linear interpolation of the sales made during a given
number of previous months.
10
good producer 9 .
The NPV is computed considering the present cost of investments, i.e., pKI
and the discounted values of the future cash flow given by the augmented
productive capacity.
In particular, we consider
NPV (I) = −pK I +
m∗∑
m=1
p̂mC∆q
m
C
(1 + r
12
)m
, (4)
where p̂mC is the expected consumption goods price level
10 at month m, r
is the weighted average yearly cost of capital for the CGP, and ∆qmC is the
additional amount of monthly production given by the capital investment I,
after properly taking into account the depreciation given by ξ, i.e.,
∆qmC = γL
α
(
K + (1− ξ)(m−1)I
)β − γLαKβ . (5)
The end value m∗ of the sum is given by the number of months when in-
vestment is still higher than a given threshold after considering the monthly
depreciation rate ξ. The CGP demands the amount I of capital goods that
maximizes the NPV (I). If NPV (I) < 0 for any I in the grid, no investment
should be done. Finally, it is worth remembering that CGPs are never rationed
in the demand for capital goods; however, they may be obliged to reduce the
investment schedule because rationed in the credit market.
2.2 Supply of capital goods
Capital goods are offered with infinite supply by a single capital goods pro-
ducer (KGP), which follows a build to order production approach. No inven-
tories and financing needs are then considered for the KGP. Energy and raw
materials are the only factor of production and are assumed to be imported
from abroad. The price of energy and raw materials is exogenously given and
set to a constant value. The price of capital goods pK is a fixed mark-up on
energy prices and therefore is also constant in this setting. Profits of the cap-
ital good producer are distributed in equal shares among all households. Put
differently, it is assumed that all households own equal shares of the capital
9 See e.g. Raberto et al (2011) for some details about the stylized modeling of
capital goods producers in Eurace.
10As common in agent-based computational models, the approach is the one of
adaptive expectations. Expected inflation is then computed based on past inflation,
measured in a given moving time window.
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goods producer and that shares are not traded in any market. Therefore, the
amount payed by consumption goods producers for capital goods is partially
(the part related to mark-up) channeled back into the economy, while the part
related to energy costs leaves the Eurace economy.
3 Credit financing of investments
Consumption goods producers face the liquidity needs necessary to finance the
production and investment plans as well as the scheduled financial payments,
i.e. interests, debt installments, taxes and dividends. They decide between
internal and external capital according to the pecking-order theory (Myers
and Majluf, 1984), which states that, because of information asymmetries
present in both credit and equity markets, firms prefer to meet their financial
payments first by using their internal liquidity, then by means of new debt, if
liquidity is not sufficient, then by issuing new equity if rationed in the credit
market.
It is worth noting that if the producer is unable to meet its financial pay-
ments, it goes into bankruptcy. Two types of bankruptcies are considered,
i.e., insolvency and illiquidity bankruptcies. The first type is when CGP’s eq-
uity goes negative. The second type is when the CGP is unable to pay its
financial commitments but still owns a positive equity. The significative dif-
ference between the two types of bankruptcies is that, in case of insolvency
bankruptcy, CGP’s debt is restructured, i.e. the debt is reduced to a target
fraction of CGP’s total assets and the corresponding loans in the portfolios
of lending banks are written-off s for the banks’ equity. When a CGP goes
into bankruptcy, either of the insolvency or of the illiquidity type, it fires all
its employees, stopping production for a period necessary to raise new equity
capital in the stock market in order to further strengthen its capital base and
increase its liquidity.
In the following, we will discuss in detail how the supply of credit is determined
within the banking sector.
3.1 Credit supply
Credit to consumption goods producers is provided by banks, who are sup-
posed to be short-term profits maximizers. Households deposits are not re-
warded and interests due to loans from the central bank are the only costs for
banks. Given the positive difference between the lending rate to the corporate
sector and the central bank rate, banks can always increase their profits by
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increasing their lending. Banks are then supposed to always fulfil loan requests
if regulatory constraints are satisfied, i.e. if capital requirements are met. In
particular, following the Basel II capital adequacy rules, we stipulate that a
minimum percentage of the risk-weighted loan portfolio should be held by the
bank in the form of equity capital as a buffer for possible loan write-offs and
equity losses. We denote this minimum percentage as κ and we call it capital
requirement. The risk weight ωλ of any loan λ depends on the borrower credit
worthiness after the loan and is measured by using its balance sheet entries.
Let us suppose that a bank b, with equity Eb and risk weighted loan portfolio
W b, receives a loan request amount λf from CGP f , characterized by debt
Df and equity Ef , then the bank is allowed to lend to the CGP an amount
`bf ≤ λf given by:
`bf =

λf if Eb ≥ κ (W b + ωλλf ) ,
Eb−κW b
κωλ
if κW b < Eb < κ(W b + ωλλf ) ,
0 if Eb ≤ κW b .
(6)
The rationale of the rule is that the bank is allowed to lend up to the amount
`bf that, weighted by the loan riskiness ωλ and summed to its present risky
weighted portfolioW b, can be sustained by its equity base Eb, which should be
at least κ % of W b + ωλ`bf . The loan riskiness ωλ is computed by considering
first the borrower’s default probability, along the lines of the Moody’s KMV
model (Saunders and Allen, 2010), then by adopting an ad-hoc approximation
of the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach that, given the credit rating
of the borrower (here given by the default probability), provides the loan
riskiness ωλ. In particular, inspired by the Moody’s KMV model (Saunders
and Allen, 2010), we consider the balance sheet entries of the borrower as an
indicator of its distance to default or, alternatively, probability of default and
credit rating. In this context, the probability of default pif of borrower f is
defined as:
pif =
Df + λf
Df + λf + Ef
, (7)
where the rationale is that the lower is the capital base of the borrower with
respect to its debt, the higher is the likelihood of default, because of possible
equity losses due to negative earnings. We then stipulate that the risk weight
of the loan depends on pif through an ad-hoc function as follows:
ωλ = 2.5(pif )3 . (8)
This particular cubic function has to be considered as an approximation of
the so-called Basel II internal ratings approach, after considering its graphical
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representation as in Yeh et al (2005)[Figure 2].
3.2 Adaptive minimum capital requirements
Following the recommendations of the Basel committee, we implement into
the model a mechanism to encourage 11 banks to build up and release capi-
tal buffers, according to the overall economic conditions of the economy, that
are generally identified with “bad times” and “good times”. The main idea
is that in “good times” banks should build up a precautionary capital buffer
and release it in bad times when credit is scarcely available. The concept of
good and bad times is clearly related with expansion and contraction of the
economic cycle, but the tricky part is to chose the conditioning variable that
permits to identify if times are good or bad. Several possibility has been al-
ready suggested. Drehmann et al (2010) suggest three typologies of condition-
ing variables. The first one includes measures of the aggregate macroeconomic
conditions (GDP growth, banks and non banks credit growth, or their ratio),
the second one focuses on the banking sector activity (banks aggregate profits
and losses, banks credit growth), while the last one is related to the cost of
funding for banks (spreads and cost of liquidity). We chose to use in our study
a conditioning variable for each of the first two typologies, the unemployment
rate as a measure of aggregate macroeconomic conditions and aggregate banks
loans as a measure of the banking sector activity.
The first rule for setting the minimum capital requirement κ is a piecewise
linear rule that maps the unemployment rate into κ. The logic is that the
capital requirement should be tighter when we are in “good times” (low un-
employment rate) while should be more relaxed when we are in “bad times”
(high unemployment rate). The capital requirement 12 κut is then given by:
κut =
κmax − (κmax − κmin)
ut
u¯
if ut < u¯ ,
κmin if ut ≥ u¯ .
(9)
We use the notation κut here to highlight the dependence on time and on
11 Let us note that we are more “compelling” that encouraging banks, because our
mechanism cyclically moves minimum capital requirements, as shown in equation
9 and 10. This may be questionable (see Repullo et al (2010); Repullo and Saurina
(2011); Gordy (2009)) but it appears to us an acceptable simplification, considering
that in the model banks only have loans as risky assets in their portfolio
12We omit the adjective “minimum” here to avoid confusion between κut that is the
minimum level of capital required to banks at time t, and κmin that is the minimum
level under which the time varying κ can not drop, and that is independent from
time
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the unemployment rate. The values of κut then lies in an interval between a
minimum level κmin, reached when the unemployment is higher than a given
threshold u¯, and a maximum value κmax that is assumed at full employment.
In the computational experiments presented here, we have set κmin = 8%,
which is the the actual reference in the Basel II accords, κmax = 12% and
u¯ = 25%. The parameter u¯ determines the slope of the straight line in the
(ut, κ
u
t ) plane, and represents the threshold unemployment rate above which
the maximum leverage is set to κmin.
The mechanism of the second rule is essentially the same as the previous one,
using the aggregate loan portfolio of all banks as the conditioning variable. If
Lt is the sum of all outstanding bank loans at month t, the decision making
about capital requirement is made according to:
κct =
κmin + (κmax − κmin)
ut
u¯
if ∆Lt
Lt
< η ,
κmax if
∆Lt
Lt
≥ η .
(10)
where ∆Lt/Lt is the percentage increase (or decrease) of aggregate credit L
from month t − 1 to month t. The parameter η represents in this case the
threshold monthly credit growth above which κct is set to κmax. The notation
is κct to highlight the dependence on time and on the unemployment rate. In
the set of simulations presented in this paper, η = 5%, i.e., if monthly credit
growth is higher that 5%, capital requirement is the maximum one (12%).
The rationale behind the rule is again to force banks to build up buffers in
good times, which are usually characterized by a rapid growth of credit, that
can be drawn down in bad ones. Buffers should be understood as capital in
excess that is available to absorb losses in bad times. Real world experience as
well as Eurace simulations have showed that a too rapid credit growth, while
benefitting in the short term, can result in a bubble burst in the long run,
when high levels of leverage become unsustainable. In this perspective, this
new rule for κct can also be interpreted on one hand as a way to moderate a too
rapid growth of credit by increasing the minimum requirements of capital for
banks and, on the other hand, as an attempt to prevent the effects of banks’s
loans write-off on the credit supply. Finally, it is worth noting that whatever
the negative value ∆Lt/Lt can be, we stipulate that capital requirement can
never drop under the minimum level of κmin, set to 8%.
4 Computational experiments
We present in this section several tables resuming the average values (with
relative standard errors) of some of the main economic indicators in order to
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cons. goods inv. goods unempl. banks’ firms’
κ (%)
production production rate (%) loans leverage
8 9629 (25) 1620 (14) 2.84 (0.18) 151393 (1042) 3.21 (0.02)
10 9530 (29) 1530 (18) 2.86 (0.18) 143659 (1090) 2.85 (0.02)
12 9486 (27) 1486 (14) 2.88 (0.18) 138126 (840) 2.60 (0.01)
κut 9411 (40) 1442 (24) 2.95 (0.20) 136749 (1246) 2.58 (0.02)
κct 8518 (57) 1069 (12) 7.54 (0.57) 121650 (512) 2.23 (0.01)
Table 3
Values of the main economic indicators in the first 5 years of simulation for different
capital requirements (κ). An unemployment rule κut (average value = 11.54) and a
credit rule κct (average value = 9.65) has been used to set dynamic requirements.
Values are averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets)
compare the overall performance of the artificial economy for the three differ-
ent values of minimum capital requirement. In the same tables we also present
the values of the same economic indicators in the two implemented cases of
macro-prudential policy, i.e., a countercyclical buffer capital mechanism that
uses the unemployment rate as conditioning variable, as shown in eq. 9, and a
second one based on banks credit growth, as in eq. 10. Moreover, consistently
with the presentation plan adopted in Raberto et al (2011), we separate the
simulations into two time periods. The first period shows the first 5 years of
simulation while the second period represents the remaining 25 years.
Even in a different setting, results are in agreement with the explications dis-
cussed in Raberto et al (2011). When capital requirement is low the economic
performance is good in the short term, due to the major amount of credit
granted by banks, but bad in the long term because of the augmented finan-
cial fragility of firms that leads to a higher risk of insolvency. This mechanism
cons. goods inv. goods real GDP unempl.
κ (%)
production production level rate (%)
8 14296 (160) 3650 (188) 17946 (333) 8.1 (0.5)
10 14637 (126) 3460 (154) 18097 (243) 7.6 (0.4)
12 15081 (154) 3729 (137) 18810 (270) 6.2 (0.4)
κut 15040 (157) 3686 (131) 18727 (270) 5.5 (0.5)
κct 15419 (151) 3901 (103) 19320 (224) 3.2 (0.4)
Table 4
Values of real variables in the last 25 years of simulation for different capital re-
quirements (κ). An unemployment rule κut (average value = 11.34) and a credit rule
κct (average value = 9.61) has been used to set dynamic requirements. Values are
averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets)
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price inflation wage interest
κ (%)
index rate (%) index rate (%)
8 1.53 (0.03) 5.92 (0.20) 6.76 (0.13) 8.41 (0.21)
10 1.53 (0.02) 6.12 (0.23) 6.84 (0.09) 8.61 (0.23)
12 1.55 (0.02) 6.33 (0.17) 7.03 (0.12) 8.82 (0.15)
κut 1.51 (0.02) 6.22 (0.21) 6.97 (0.12) 8.58 (0.14)
κct 1.43 (0.02) 6.13 (0.12) 7.27 (0.15) 6.90 (0.25)
Table 5
Values of price variables in the last 25 years of simulation for different capital
requirements (κ). An unemployment rule κut (average value = 11.34) and a credit
rule κct (average value = 9.61) has been used to set dynamic requirements. Values
are averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets)
total banks’ firms’ illiquidity insolvency
κ (%)
loans equity leverage bankrupt. bankrupt.
8 720375 (25922) 78003 (4331) 7.19 (0.85) 11.0 (0.5) 4.5 (0.2)
10 681196 (23748) 93022 (4280) 6.74 (0.58) 8.3 (0.4) 4.2 (0.1)
12 722717 (25495) 117812 (5448) 7.12 (1.26) 7.4 (0.4) 4.1 (0.2)
κut 698161 (17714) 105051 (3474) 6.76 (1.55) 9.0 (0.4) 3.8 (0.1)
κct 590332 (10978) 53261 (1841) 5.69 (3.31) 15.1 (0.8) 0.6 (0.1)
Table 6
Values of risk signaling variables in the last 25 years of simulation for different
capital requirements (κ). An unemployment rule κut (average value = 11.34) and a
credit rule κct (average value = 9.61) has been used to set dynamic requirements.
Columns 4 and 5 show the annual bankruptcy probability for a firm. Values are
averaged over 20 different random seeds (standard errors are in brackets)
closely mimics what is reported in BIS (2011), i.e., that banks capital losses
“can destabilize the banking sector, which can bring about or exacerbate a
downturn in the real economy. This in turn can further destabilize the bank-
ing sector...”. This is exactly what happens in our model. In the short run
real consumption, employment and investments (and therefore real GDP) are
higher for loose capital requirements, due to the easier access to bank loans.
However a worrying element is already present in the short run: firms lever-
age increases when relaxing capital requirement, raising economy’s financial
fragility (or systemic risk). Table 3 corroborates this narrative with the proper
economic indicators. To observe the vicious circle between banking sector and
real economy, emphasized by BIS (2011), we have to move to the medium-long
run. Table 4 shows that the hierarchy emerged in the short run is completely
reversed. Tighter capital requirements allow for better economic performances
in the long run, in terms of consumption goods production, unemployment
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Fig. 1. Time evolution of GDP components. Two lines correspond to different fixed
values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one represents the out-
come of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning variable (κct).
rate and real GDP level. Basically, loose capital requirements tend to push
firms towards an unbalanced debt-equity ratio, with excess of debt. This can
be observed in figure 5, where firms leverage is plot for a sample case. The
higher financial fragility of firms determines a higher probability for firms to
get into insolvency bankruptcy, as shown in table 6, with obvious damage for
commercial banks equity capital (see figure 4) that undermines the resilience
of the banking system. Banks capital losses trigger in turn a credit contraction
that prevents firms to roll over debt, therefore exacerbating the downturn in
the real economy thought chains of illiquidity bankruptcies. In table 6 it can
be observed a clear trend for banks equity and firms insolvency bankrupt-
cies, showing that these economic indicators deteriorate when relaxing capital
18
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Fig. 2. Time evolution of GDP and unemployment rate. Two lines correspond to
different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one repre-
sents the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning
variable (κct).
requirements.
From figure 2 it clearly emerges the difference between κmin = 8% (that is
the minimum capital currently required by Basel II) and κmin = 12%. In
both cases a turbulent period starts in the 5th year (look at figure 2), first
with a severe crisis and then with a period of stagnation that ends in the
7th year of simulation. Observing the dynamics of the aggregate banks eq-
uity capital in figure 4, it can be noticed that a tighter capital requirement
(κmin = 12%) forces banks to raise their equity while when the requirement
is lower (κmin = 8%) banks can match the credit demand with a lower level
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Fig. 3. Time evolution of yearly inflation and base interest rate. Two lines corre-
spond to different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third
one represents the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as
conditioning variable (κct).
of equity capital. The capital surplus (or buffer) owned by banks in the case
of κmin = 12% makes the difference when facing the following crisis starting
in the 9th year, allowing the economy to recover quickly from the recession by
means of a injection of new credit money by the banking sector. On the other
hand, when equity capital is too low, the banking system is not able to fuel
the economy with new credit, even if capital requirement is looser, and the
depression continues much deeper and for a much longer time. It is interest-
ing to observe the clear bifurcation of the two time trajectories representing
the total outstanding credit, emerging as a consequence of the 9th year crisis,
and revealing the apparent paradox that banks will be much more ”generous”
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Fig. 4. Time evolution of total credit and aggregate banks equity capital. Two lines
correspond to different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the
third one represents the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth
as conditioning variable (κct).
lenders for the following 20 years in the case of higher capital requirement.
The lesson learned by this example is that having a capital buffer in bad times
is useful. As extensively commented in the introduction, the same lesson seems
to be shared by the main banking policy regulators, thus we present here the
results of two computational experiments where two different rules to build-up
capital buffers have been implemented. The first one uses the unemployment
rate as a conditioning variable, as reported in eq. 9, while the second uses
banks loans, as in eq. 10.
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Fig. 5. Time evolution of firms financial fragility indicators. Two lines correspond to
different fixed values for minimum capital requirement κ, while the third one repre-
sents the outcome of the capital buffer rule based on credit growth as conditioning
variable (κct).
The two rules seem both to have a positive impact on the economic perfor-
mance. In particular, the capital buffer rule based on the unemployment rate
(i.e., κut ) improves all the economic indicators in the long run. These results
confirm and extend preliminary explication discussed in Teglio et al (2012).
Table 4 shows that in the case of κut the average unemployment rate is lower
than for fixed capital requirements, and the average output is higher. The
interesting point about this result is that dynamic requirements κut , varying
in a range from 8% to 12% with mean 11.34, perform better that the two
range extremes, including the highest one (12%). So it is not true that tighter
capital requirements are a better option overall, because it depends from the
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Fig. 6. Probability density function (PDF) estimation of the equity capital percent-
age variations for three different regulatory policies.
state of the economy. In some cases, according to our outcomes, relaxing the
capital requirement is beneficial.
In order to analyze in more detail the effects of these policies, we plotted the
time trajectories of the simulation with bank credit growth as a conditioning
variable (case κct) along with the two extreme cases κ = 8% and 12% (for
the seek of plots readability we omitted to superimpose the case of κct). Be-
fore looking at them, let us highlight the excellent performance of the “credit
rule” κct . Whilst suffering in the first five years (see table 3) the economy of
the “credit rule” is characterized by the best economic indicators: consump-
tion, investments, unemployment rate, real wages, firms financial fragility, and
others. Tables from 4 to 6 attest these results. The only apparently jarring
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note in this idyllic picture is banks equity, significantly lower than the rest of
the cases. Moreover, from an overall glance at the presented plots it clearly
appears that the economy is considerable more stable in the case of the “credit
rule”. In the following we try to interpret these outcomes.
First, let us note that the initial conditions are the same for all cases, and
that banks are characterized at the beginning by a strong capitalization with
equity equal to 20% of weighted assets. We remind also that banks raise their
equity capital when the capital requirement constraint is binding, i.e., when
they are not able to satisfy the credit demand because of the low equity. The
“credit rule” states that when credit grows, capital requirement also grows,
but it remains lower when credit stagnates. So, at the beginning of the κct case
simulation, there is no need for banks to raise the equity because of the low
credit growth (see figure 4). In the other two cases (κ = 8% and 12%), on the
other hand, banks have to raise equity to match the growing credit demand.
However, looking to figure 5, we can see how firms high borrowing raises the
interest bill, increasing consequently firms bankruptcy risk. On the contrary,
in the κct case the situation is much more stable. In fact, the high level of firms
debt ends in a big economic crash around month 100, accompanied by a quick
deleveraging process. This crisis, strong for κ = 8% and milder for κ = 12%,
does not affect the the κct case at all. When the “credit rule” rule is active, the
total outstanding credit is growing much more smoothly. The same holds for
banks equity, that is rarely affected by falls caused by insolvency bankruptcies
(6). Illiquidity bankruptcies are more frequent but the banking system is not
directly affected, remaining robust and propagating its robustness to the real
economy.
Figure 6 compares banks equity variations considering the whole simulation
set. The higher robustness of the banking sector in the case of κct is therefore
extended from a single simulation seed to the general case. In particular, it
can be observed from the plot that the falls of banks equity are much more
infrequent in case banks build up capital buffers according to the rule based on
credit growth. These results tell us that lower aggregated values of outstanding
bank loans and of banks equity capital do not have negative implications on
the economy if credit is granted at the right time. In this sense, it seems to be
desirable to have active (public) institutions in charge of ruling banks credit
supply according to the macroeconomic conjuncture.
Concluding remarks
After the recent financial and economic crisis the Basel III global regulatory
standard has been proposed in order to improve the resilience of the banking
system. This new framework is oriented towards a more active support of
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macroeconomic policies, and presents a set of macro-prudential regulations
with the objective to limit systemic risk. In particular, it has been identified
the procyclical amplification of financial shocks through the banking system
as a critical issue, and in order to cope with such procyclical dynamics new
countercyclical capital buffers regulations has been proposed. The rational is
to encourage banks to accumulate capital during good times and use it when
the economic conditions are bad.
A coherent economic analysis has emerged from some previous works by the
authors, where computational experiments were performed with the Eurace
model. In particular, it has been shown that excessive bank leverages can
drive economies into severe recession in the medium-long run. In this paper
we implement into the model a mechanism to encourage banks to build up
and release capital buffers, according to the overall economic conditions of
the economy. As conditioning variables that set banks capital requirements,
thus ruling the capital buffers build up and release phases, we use both the
unemployment rate and aggregate banks loans.
Moreover, the setting of the model has been improved incorporating a new
demand for firms investments that is based on the net present value (NPV)
approach, which is one of the most popular methods used by managers to eval-
uate investments. Therefore, the new model for investments can be considered
well grounded on a more realistic behavior of economic actors.
Results confirm an extend our previous studies, showing that loose capital
requirements can affect the economic performance in the medium-long run,
raising the financial fragility (or systemic risk) in the economic system and
potentially triggering chains of firms insolvency bankruptcies. The situation
is generally better when setting tighter capital requirements. Furthermore,
results have shown that the dynamic regulation of capital requirements suc-
cessfully stabilizes the economy and improves the main economic indicators.
In particular, when the “credit rule” is adopted, the economic scenario seems
to change in a significant way, showing a much more solid banking sector with
a resulting positive effect on the real economy.
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